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Theodore L. Turocy,
Behavioural game theorist
Director, Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science, University of East Anglia Senior Lecturer, School of Economics, University of East Anglia Director, The Gambit Project |
Intertemporal speculation under uncertain future demand: Experimental results
- Citation:
- Plott, C.R., Turocy, T.L. (1997) Intertemporal speculation under uncertain future demand: Experimental results. In Understanding Strategic Interaction: Essays in Honor of Reinhard Selten, Albers, W., Guth, W., Hammerstein, P., Moldovanu, B., van Damme, E., eds. Berlin: Springer.
- Abstract:
- This paper explores a market in which a subset of agents acting independently without direct communication can purchase commodities to carry forward in time in the face of uncertain future demand. The hypothesis that the equilibrating peoperties of market will coordinate decentralized decisions to speculate as if all information was public gives no theory about the mechanism through which such information transfer might take place. The results provide general support for the validity of the equilibriation suggestion. The mechanisms of information transfer seem to be located in the local nature of the price formation and carry-forward decisions coupled with a tendency for traders to specialize their activities.